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Blackout at the ballot: How Uganda’s 2026 internet shutdown darkened a nation’s democracy

Gulu | A new report released by the digital rights organisation, Unwanted Witness concludes that a significant, deliberate and centrally coordinated internet disruptions unfolded before, during and after Uganda’s January 15, 2026, general elections.

The findings paint a picture of a systematic strategy of digital control that, according to the report, undermined electoral integrity, violated constitutional guarantees and inflicted widespread economic harm.

“When Ugandans woke up on January 14, 2026, the silence was digital; messages would not send, news sites would not lead, social media timelines froze mid-scroll and by the time polls opened the next morning, the country was in a familiar but deepened darkness,” the report highlighted.

According to the report, this was neither accidental nor spontaneous but deliberately engineered at the highest levels of government and for the third consecutive election cycle under President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda conducted its vote in digital darkness.

As early as September 2025, State Minister for ICT Godfrey Kabbyanga Baluku publicly warned that the government would ‘interrupt connections’ if intelligence suggested that the internet might be used to incite violence.

He delivered the remarks at a Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) meeting in Gulu City, and it was widely interpreted by Civil Society as a signal of what was to come, thus, the 2026 blackout did not begin on election eve, but rather it began months earlier.

In December 2025, the Uganda Revenue Authority restricted the importation of Starlink satellite internet equipment without military clearance reportedly requiring approval from Chief of Defence Forces General Muhoozi Kainerugaba; hence, the move effectively eliminated an alternative connectivity option that had been viewed as resistant to centralised shutdown orders.

Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine described the measures as preparation for ‘election fraud’ and digital repression.

By early January 2026, precursor interference had begun and users reported throttled speeds and difficulties accessing app stores to download virtual private networks (VPNs) and social media platforms including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), WhatsApp, and Instagram were blocked around January 12. However, on the evening of January 13, the country went offline.

Four days of total silence

According to the report, a full nationwide internet shutdown was imposed across all major forms of connectivity like mobile broadband, fibre-optic networks and satellite services with technical measurements recording uniform disruption patterns across network operators, suggesting centralised coordination rather than isolated technical failures.

The report highlighted that the blackout lasted approximately four days spanning election day and the critical post-polling period and partial restoration began on January 18, but major social media and messaging platforms remained blocked until January 26.

In total, Ugandans endured nearly two weeks of abnormal connectivity and for journalists, it was déjà vu.

On the same day, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) issued a public administrative notice urging taxpayers to complete online tax filing and payments by 12 January, 2026 (from the usual 15th day of every month), three days before polling; although not explicitly referencing connectivity risks, this preemptive deadline functioned as an indirect signal of anticipated internet disruption during the election period.

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Unwanted Witness’s 2021 report, “Journalism Blocked, Information Seized,” documented similar disruptions during the previous election and in 2016 and 2021, authorities had framed shutdowns as national security measures and in 2026, the pattern not only repeated but it expanded.

However, this time, the report says, authorities introduced new features; pre-emptive elimination of satellite alternatives, intensified warnings about surveillance and VPN use and deterrent messaging that fostered what many described as a ‘Fear of Digital Suppression.’

Uganda’s 1995 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and access to information under Articles 29 and 47; Article 43 permits limitations only if demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

The report argues the shutdown failed, that test and blanket internet restrictions impose indiscriminate limitations on millions of lawful users, voters, journalists, businesses, civil society organizations and election observers without individualised suspicion or judicial oversight.

Further, the report notes that there was no declared state of emergency under Article 110 of the constitution and it contends that the Uganda Communications Act of 2013 explicitly authorises the UCC to suspend nationwide internet access.

Additionally, International law echoes these protections and Uganda is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) whose Article 19 protects the right to seek, receive and impart information ‘through any media’ while the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights similarly safeguards freedom of expression and access to information.

In 2016, the UN Human Rights Council affirmed that the same rights people enjoy offline must also be protected online, yet during one of the most consequential democratic exercises in the country’s five-decade political history, those rights were effectively switched off.

Electoral integrity in the dark

The report further revealed that the shutdown had democratic consequences where voter education campaigns stalled, election observers struggled to transmit findings, independent media could not live stream events or upload reports and citizens were unable to share images of tally sheets or report irregularities in real time.

Meanwhile, what the report describes as the ‘selective preservation of essential services’ allowed administrative and certain economic systems to function while public discourse remained blocked hence reinforcing the perception that democratic participation was treated as non-essential.

Furthermore, political mobilization, particularly for opposition across reliant on digital platforms hence was sharply constrained.

President Museveni who first came to power in 1986 after a protracted guerrilla war and later oversaw the removal of presidential term and age limits in 2005 and 2017 respectively securing another term in the January 15 vote amid allegations of irregularities and suppression of dissent.

In the report, the government has consistently defended past shutdowns as necessary to maintain public order and national security but critics argue that such measures disproportionately silence dissent and conceal electoral malpractice.

During the 2021 shutdown, analysts estimated losses of up to $100 million, while comprehensive figures for 2026 are still emerging, early indicators suggest significant disruption to digital commerce, mobile money transactions, remittances, tourism services, online banking and tax systems.

Small businesses and informal workers bore the brunt with vendors who rely on WhatsApp orders, ride-hailing drivers, online freelancers and digital content creators saw incomes evaporate overnight.

“Journalists, many of whom shifted online after years of regulatory clampdowns on traditional media, were again cut off from audiences,” the report disclosed.

Further, the social impacts rippled outward and reduced access to health information, educational resources and community support networks, particularly affecting rural communities, women, youth and persons with disabilities.

A pattern of regulatory overreach

The report identifies systemic accountability failures that enabled the shutdown and among them, the absence of prior judicial authorisation, lack of clear statutory authority empowering regulators to impose blanket internet suspensions, regulatory opacity and vague justifications, weak parliamentary oversight and limited transparency from telecom operators who implemented directives without public disclosure.

While the UCC is mandated to license and supervise communications providers, critics argue that regulation does not equate to suspension of fundamental rights.

Similarly, Uganda’s National ICT Policy and cybersecurity frameworks contemplate crisis response but do not clearly establish rights-compliant thresholds for nationwide connectivity restrictions.

The report further notes that security agencies including the Internal Security Organisation and External Security Organization have historically collaborated with regulatory bodies on surveillance and SIM card registration initiatives.

It further suggests that the 2026 measures reflect a governance environment in which security imperatives override constitutional safeguards without formal emergency declarations.

Therefore, the Unwanted Witness urges sweeping reforms and recommends that prior judicial authorisation for any future internet shutdown should be in place and also establishing explicit statutory limits on regulatory powers, mandating transparency and public notice, strengthening the independence of communications regulators and requiring telecom operators to conduct human rights impact assessments and publish transparency reports on government requests.

The report also calls on civil society, regional bodies such as the African Union, and international partners to institutionalise early warning systems and coordinated litigation to raise the political cost of digital repression.

Hence, it further warned that without structural reform, the future elections risk being conducted under conditions that systematically constrain participation, scrutiny and trust.

In 2012, the UN Human Rights Council recognised internet access as integral to the realisation of fundamental freedom and the COVID-19 pandemic further entrenched the internet as essential infrastructure for education, work and health.

In Uganda, the report concludes that internet access during elections has become politically contingent rather than constitutionally protected and the 2026 shutdown was not merely a technical disruption.

Therefore, the shutdown was a test of whether digital infrastructure is treated as democratic scaffolding or as a switch to be flipped in months of political vulnerability.


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