Uganda’s constitutional promise of a fair trial is not fulfilled merely because an accused person is allowed to speak in court.
Fairness also depends on how criminal charges are framed, whether the law clearly identifies prohibited conduct, and whether the judicial officer who hears the case approaches it with an open and impartial mind.
The Constitutional Court’s decision in Kalali Steven and Others v Attorney General [2026] UGCC 8, delivered on 4 November 2026, addresses these connected safeguards.
The consolidated petitions raised concerns about section 115(1) and (3) of the Penal Code Act and section 42 of the Magistrates Courts Act. The Court’s unanimous decision is important not because it removed criminal accountability, but because it insisted that criminal justice must operate within constitutional limits.
Equality before the criminal law
The Court considered provisions that framed the relevant protection in terms of “any woman or girl”. It found the gender-specific wording discriminatory because the harm addressed by the provisions could also be suffered by men and boys.
The Court was not persuaded that the limitation could be justified as affirmative action. Protection against the conduct in question should not depend on the sex of the person affected.
Rather than striking down the entire provisions, the Court used its constitutional interpretive power under Article 274(1). It directed that the words “any woman or girl” be replaced with “any person”, with immediate effect.
The Attorney General, through the relevant government processes, was also directed to pursue legislative amendment within 12 months. The result is a broader and more equal scope of protection.
The decision also raises a rule-of-law concern about precision. Criminal provisions must give people fair notice of what conduct is prohibited.
The Court was concerned that expressions such as “any word”, “any sound”, “any gesture” and “any object”, without a sufficiently clear definition of the prohibited insult to modesty, could leave too much uncertainty. The legislature was therefore called upon to define the prohibited conduct with greater precision.
The importance of an impartial magistrate
The second major issue concerned a procedure under which a magistrate could participate in preliminary consultation, consider whether a prima facie case existed, help formulate a charge and later preside over the trial.
The Attorney General’s counsel conceded that the arrangement was constitutionally problematic, but the Court independently examined the issue.
The Court applied an objective test: whether a reasonable observer, informed of the relevant circumstances, would apprehend a real possibility of bias. A magistrate who has already participated in assessing the allegations and shaping the charge may appear to have formed a view before hearing the evidence at trial.
The concern is not simply whether the magistrate is personally honest. Justice must also be seen to be done.
The Court held that the arrangement violated the right to a fair hearing under Article 28(1), read with the non-derogable protection in Article 44(c), and the constitutional principles governing the administration of justice and judicial independence.
The relevant provisions were declared void to the extent that they permitted the same magistrate to perform the pre-trial functions and then conduct the trial.
The Court did not abolish private prosecutions. It preserved a role for a magistrate receiving a private complaint to consider jurisdiction and whether the complaint discloses a prima facie basis to proceed.
However, the charge should thereafter be drawn by the complainant or their advocate, or referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. A magistrate who has undertaken the pre-trial consultation must not preside over the trial.
What should happen next?
The judgment has practical implications for the Judiciary, prosecutors, the legal profession and the legislature. Court administration must ensure that magistrates who have undertaken the relevant pre-trial functions are not assigned to try the same matter.
Prosecutors and private complainants must understand the revised allocation of responsibilities. Parliament and the responsible ministries must address the Court’s direction to clarify the statutory language and implement the required reforms.
The decision should not be misunderstood as a technical obstacle to prosecution. It is a reminder that the legitimacy of a conviction depends on a lawful process.
A system that protects complainants while respecting the rights of accused persons strengthens public confidence in criminal justice. Equally, clear criminal laws help police, prosecutors, courts and the public understand the boundaries of criminal liability.
The broader lesson is that fair-trial protection begins long before the first witness enters the courtroom. Equality, legality and impartiality are not optional procedural refinements; they are essential conditions of constitutional criminal justice.
About the author: Kiiza Smith is a Ugandan advocate, legal academic and independent researcher based in Kampala. His work engages constitutional law, criminal justice, human rights, commercial law and governance.
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